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The political reality
The efficient and effective taxation of African 
mining would be a valuable public good. In 
2012, over half of African countries were 
mineral producers and twenty of them, out 
of a total of fifty-four, were natural resource-
rich according to IMF criteria. In practice, 
the sector is taxed badly, and is likely very 
much under-taxed. It is estimated that, 
during the 2000-10 natural resource super-
cycle, while turnover in the mining sector 
increased globally by a factor of 4.6, tax 
revenues earned by African governments 
increased only by a factor of 1.15. 
According to one study, a group of African 
governments could have collected 70 billion 
USD in additional tax in the years 2003-8 if 
they had levied the same implicit rate of tax 
on mining as the Australian government. 
Even if the world market prices of mined 
commodities were to recover from the 
recent slump, improvements in the taxation 
of mining are likely to be slow and difficult. 
There are a set of structural characteristics 
of mining, especially pronounced in Africa, 
that result in mining projects and mining 
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taxation typically becoming highly politicised 
and enmeshed in controversy, confrontation, 
uncertainty, large-scale rent-taking and a 
range of illicit practices. These structural 
characteristics2 include: 
Very large ‘rents’ (super-profits) can be earned 
from control of mineral resources. This creates 
incentives for politicians, criminals and predatory 
business people to find ways to obtain a share 
of these rents and for all the parties involved to 
give, seek and take bribes of various kinds. 
• Mining projects typically involve high up-front 
investment costs and long exploration and 
development phases lasting up to a decade 
before any revenue is earned. This leaves 
investors vulnerable to policy change or 
political extortion once they have made 
substantial investments.
• World market prices for minerals are unstable, 
and tend to fluctuate in long ‘super-cycles’ that 
are of very different and unpredictable lengths. 
This generates major uncertainties about the 
likely long term profitability of individual mining 
projects. 
• In terms of both volume and product quality, 
the likely output of individual mines is 
often hard to predict in the early stages of 
exploration or extraction. That again increases 
uncertainty about long term profitability.
• Most mining projects are developed and 
operated by large transnational mining 
companies, almost entirely for export markets. 
The companies may have considerable scope 
to reduce their tax bills through the use of 
transfer mispricing and other tax avoidance 
practices.
• Joint ventures between public sector 
organisations and private corporations – or 
indeed between more than one corporation 
– are widespread in the oil and gas sectors, 
but very rare in mining. This reduces the 
capacity of host governments to develop 
the understanding of the mining sector 
that enables them to tax it more efficiently 
and effectively. When negotiating mining 
contracts (for exploration, extraction, and 
final decommissioning), large transnational 
companies typically have much more relevant 
geological, engineering, economic and 
financial information and expertise than host 
governments. 
• Detailed information on movements in world 
prices for oil and gas (‘spot prices’) is widely 
available. This helps revenue authorities 
check on the revenues reported by exporting 
companies. Such price information is much 
less abundant for mined commodities. 
• Mining projects often require major supporting 
infrastructure investments, in roads, ports, 
railways, electricity and water. Governments 
may agree to reduce companies’ tax liabilities 
if they take responsibility for providing (and 
operating) this infrastructure – while typically 
having little accurate information on the real 
cost of the infrastructure or the distribution of 
the benefits between the company and the 
public.
• Mining projects may have high impacts, both 
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2 None of these characteristics are unique to mining. They appear there with greater frequency and intensity, compared even to 
typical oil and gas projects.
In practice, the [mining] 
sector is taxed badly, 
and is likely very much 
under-taxed.
and environments. On the one hand, they can 
generate jobs and business. On the other, 
they can pollute water and soil. Politicians, 
governments and the companies themselves, 
possibly aided by journalists and activist 
NGOs, have scope to manipulate local 
populations to create (competing) narratives 
about the impact of mining. They can then use 
those narratives in their own struggles to get 
control of mining rents. 
Many African countries lack stable, robust and 
transparent political institutions for reconciling 
competing interests and reaching authoritative 
public policy decisions. If they become the 
site of significant mining activities, the ‘natural’ 
outcomes are that (a) the regulation of mining – 
including taxation – takes place outside formal 
organisations and procedures, and (b) emerges 
from opaque interactions between mining 
companies and small groups of people holding 
political power. Power-holders and companies 
negotiate – directly or indirectly, smoothly or 
with conflict – a range of inter-related issues, 
including rights to explore and extract minerals, 
infrastructure provision and taxation. Companies 
might accept low tax obligations in return for, 
for example, commitments to finance and build 
new roads and ports or understandings that they 
will help finance the current power-holders in 
future elections. Taxation arrangements may be 
specified in agreements between investors and 
presidents, with little reference either to national 
tax law and practice, or to the national revenue 
authority. Those agreements are not always 
(fully) public. It seems highly likely that the 
purpose and result of this mode of negotiating 
the regulation of mining is to advantage both 
parties – power-holders and companies – at a 
cost to the public treasury.
How should mining be 
taxed?
Mining is different from most economic activities 
in that it can generate a substantial rent – an 
income that exceeds the cost of extraction (plus 
a reasonable profit) – because of the potential 
inherent value of the pre-existing subsoil asset. 
There is a consensus that in principle the rent 
belongs to the country in which extraction 
takes place, as a compensation for the loss 
of a non-renewable resource. In principle, a 
high proportion of this rent could and perhaps 
should be taxed away by the host government, 
as the representative of the country and its 
people. In principle, that would not discourage 
private investment in exploration and mining 
production, provided only that investors are 
rewarded for the high levels of economic 
and political risk associated with mining. By 
contrast, various estimates suggest that the 
revenues that (African) governments obtain 
from mining far below the rents derived from it.3 
However, the estimates of the size of rents are 
very approximate. Accurate information on the 
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3 The IMF also believes that great recovery by governments is appreciably higher in respect of oil and gas extraction. Some of the 
reasons are mentioned earlier in this paper. 
Accurate information 
on the economics of 
many individual mining 
operations is held privately 
by the operating companies 
and is largely unavailable 
to governments or the 
public.
is held privately by the operating companies 
and is largely unavailable to governments or 
the public. And world market prices for most 
mined commodities are subject to ‘super-cycles’ 
(long swings) of a decade or two. The length 
and dimensions of these super-cycles is 
unpredictable. Any aggregate estimates made 
about the distribution of rent from mining that 
cover any recent period are dependent on the 
assumptions made about the periodicity of 
super-cycles.
From the perspective of mining investors in 
Africa, this ‘failure’ of governments to tax 
away fully mining rents is neither a failure nor 
unexpected. Investors face very high risks, 
for a range of reasons listed above, notably 
commodity price uncertainty, the high upfront 
investment costs that leave them vulnerable 
to policy changes, and political risk generally. 
A share of the mining rent is the reward they 
need to motivate them to take these risks. 
Host governments do indeed routinely seek 
to renegotiate agreements about mining 
taxation when commodity prices are high. And 
politicians, both in and out of office, talk of 
tearing up mining agreements or nationalising 
mines. Although power-holders and companies 
often appear to collude for mutual advantage in 
agreeing how mining activities will be regulated, 
the stability of those agreements is often in 
question. 
The real disagreements about taxation are not 
about abstract issues like the division of the rent 
from mining activities, but around much more 
practical issues. It is worrying that we have very 
limited knowledge about what tax regimes work 
best for mining. When it comes to fiscal regimes 
and regulatory practice in the extractives sector, 
there is: ‘no literature today comparing the 
administrative success of different kinds of fiscal 
regimes in practice’.4 All taxation, however, 
generates differences of opinion. There are 
four tax policy issues that emerge particularly 
frequently in respect of mining. Only in relation 
to the first does there seem to be a substantial 
degree of expert consensus:
• It typically makes sense to exempt mining 
projects from import VAT.5 Mine operators in 
Africa typically import a large share of their 
production inputs (notably capital equipment) 
and export almost all their product. They would 
ultimately be required to pay little VAT on this; 
because the value of their exports would be 
offset against the VAT they pay on imports. 
Many African revenue authorities find it difficult 
to give VAT refunds that are legally due. 
Exemption can be expected to give investors 
security at little cost. 
• There is less agreement on the basic 
formula for taxing the income from mining 
operations. The IMF favours a combination 
of a relatively low basic royalty (on 
production/export value) and the basic 
corporate income tax (CIT). The argument 
for keeping the royalty low (2-5 per cent) 
– and capped at perhaps 10 per cent – is 
that, because it is a levy on the gross value 
of output, not on profit, a higher rate would 
tend to render production unprofitable when 
world market prices were low. High royalties 
could therefore lead to unduly low levels of 
investment or production. The problem with 
that argument is that it implies assumptions 
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5 One major issue, however, has been raised linked to the local content discussion in oil, gas and mining, since exempting imports 
while at the same time introducing ambitious local content policies and requirements might be somewhat contradictory. This could 
be the case especially in middle-income extractive countries, but also in low-income countries concerning items with a lower 
technology and capital requirement.
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particular, it assumes that the host revenue 
authorities have the capacity to scrutinise 
the accounts of mining companies to ensure 
that they state their profits accurately. This 
assumption is often invalid. A major reason 
is that mining operating companies are 
typically members of large transnational 
corporations. Most of the cross-border 
economic transactions in which they engage 
are with ‘related parties’ – other members 
of the same transnational parent. They buy 
their capital equipment, their financing, their 
managerial staff, their technical expertise and 
other inputs from related parties. They sell 
their product to related parties. This provides 
them with considerable scope to engage 
in ‘transfer mispricing’ – to overvalue their 
imports and undervalue their exports – in 
order to shift profits to some other location in 
the world. In practice, therefore, the formula 
of a low basic royalty plus CIT might enable 
mining companies to evade CIT largely or 
completely. It is for this reason that some 
experts argue for a greater use of variable 
rate royalties and/or windfall taxes, i.e. 
levies on gross production or gross sales 
that increase as world market prices for the 
product increase. This, it is argued, provides 
some protection against the use of transfer 
mispricing to minimise the reported profit of 
mine operating companies. The argument 
does not stop here. We also cannot assume 
that government institutions are capable 
of assessing royalty dues by effectively 
monitoring the volume, quality and timing 
of reported mineral exports, or that the 
organisations with these responsibilities 
coordinate effectively with revenue 
agencies. In respect of both tax collection 
and export monitoring, there may be major 
performance problems that stem from 
combinations of (a) poor resourcing of public 
institutions, (b) the high levels of expertise 
at the command of companies, and (c) 
illicit collusion of various kinds. The overall 
conclusions are that: (a) there is no one best 
formula for taxing the incomes of mining 
companies; and (b) country-specific factors, 
including the capacities of the tax and other 
regulatory agencies, are relevant to the 
choices made.
• Mining and extractive projects in general 
frequently undergo a change of ownership 
at a relatively early stage. A ‘junior’ company 
with a low public profile and a limited concern 
for its corporate reputation organises the 
exploration and the securing of land and 
extraction rights. The operation is then sold to 
one of the larger transnational mine operators 
that are more concerned about reputational 
issues. The sale typically takes place 
‘offshore’, between two subsidiary companies 
domiciled in tax havens. The question of 
whether or not the company making the sale 
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host country has been disputed – and is the 
subject of high profile law cases. Host country 
tax law is sometimes sufficiently silent or 
ambiguous on the issue that attempts to levy 
the capital gains tax would not survive a legal 
challenge. There is a solution: governments 
should examine and revise their tax laws, 
regulations and documentation requirements 
such that capital gains taxes are payable and 
enforced in such cases.6
• Individual mining companies often operate 
more than one mining project and licence in 
a single country, as well as many producing 
sites or pits within one licence area. Indeed, 
the definition of what constitutes the fiscal 
boundaries of a registered company, its 
licences and projects is often made more 
according to administrative rather than 
‘natural’ or optimal criteria from a fiscal point 
of view. For example, a large new investment 
to extend an existing operation might be 
defined as a separate project, principally 
for the purpose of seeking and granting 
tax exemptions, even if the operations are 
contiguous and to a large degree integrated. 
The existence of more than one project, 
owned by the same company, creates 
scope for the abuse of tax exemptions 
granted to the newer project. For example, 
duty exemptions on the import of capital 
equipment for the older project might have 
expired, while they are still available for 
the new project. It is tempting for operating 
companies to label capital equipment imports 
to be used in the older project as destined 
for the new project. Similarly, expansion 
projects within a very large licence in 
geographical terms may effectively erode 
the tax base for pre-existing mining 
pits-sites within the same licence for long 
periods, and thereby render effective 
taxation difficult. To complicate even further, 
mining companies are often integrated in 
the value chain such that they own refineries 
and smelters that can be different business 
units with separate fiscal regimes. The risks 
of spillover and mispricing are high. The 
solution in principle is some sort of effective 
‘ring fencing’ – having separate accounting 
and terms for each identifiable segment, unit 
or project. Companies often tend to resist 
this, on the grounds that it complicates their 
own accounting operations. As in the case of 
royalties (above), the more obvious solution 
will only work if the regulatory authorities 
have the capacity to monitor the physical 
operations of the mining companies as well 
as their accounts. The same conclusions 
apply: general principles need to be adapted 
to local regulatory capacity.
Conclusions
1. Taxing mining is not intrinsically different 
to taxing other economic enterprises. It is, 
however, especially challenging for African 
governments because various economic, 
political, physical and organisational features 
of the industry interact to produce adverse 
consequences, notably high levels of 
information asymmetry, rent-seeking, conflict 
and policy instability; and incentives for 
powerholders and mining companies to deal 
with one another in ways that undermine 










6 The counter-argument is that such capital gains taxes will simply be factored into (i.e. deducted from) the revenues that 
mining companies will otherwise be willing to negotiate with the government, and the host country will receive the same 
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2. There is a broad consensus today, supported 
by the IMF, that it is better to legislate than 
to contract in extractives when it comes to 
main terms, in particular considering the 
challenges listed above. Overall, fiscal, labour, 
environmental and social terms should be 
set in legislation and be subject to regular 
legislative and electoral scrutiny and control. 
It is possible to define and establish fairly 
efficient and robust mining fiscal regimes that 
can deal effectively with wide variations in 
product prices and in the costs of production 
among different mines. So far in mining, 
however, as well as in oil, such fiscal regimes 
are rare in Africa. 
3. Most governments continue to issue licences 
for both exploration and production as a result 
of negotiations with individual companies on 
a ‘first come, first served’ basis. This may 
perhaps be because, for a long period in the 
later c20th century, world market prices for 
mined commodities were low and there was 
little competition to undertake new mining 
activities. It became a habit. But it is not 
justified. As Paul Collier and others have been 
arguing, it is high time for governments (a) 
to become more active in geological survey 
work, and (b) to use competition and auctions 
in the allocation of exploration and production 
rights. This can increase the flow of 
information, give governments more leverage, 
and allow them to strike deals that are more 
advantageous to public treasuries. 
4. While there is scope to tax mining more 
effectively through policy reforms, it is also 
important to: (a) improve the operational 
capacity of ministries of finance, ministries of 
mines, tax agencies and supportive regulatory 
agencies; and (b) persuade government 
leaders to uphold and respect the mandates 
and expertise of these institutions, and not to 
assert personal control. 
5. If African governments could formally agree 
to a set of principles on the taxation of the 
extractive sector, this could both strengthen 
the hand of the tax and other regulatory 
agencies and reduce the intensity of 
inter-governmental competition for mining 
investment. Transparency and accountability 
loom large here. There are already positive 
moves toward more disclosure of mining 
contracts and adoption of the EITI ++ 
standard7 (e.g. Liberia and Ghana). The 
recent OECD-brokered global agreement 
to introduce country-by-country reporting 
(i.e. disaggregation of financial accounts by 
country) for large transnational corporate 
groups is similarly positive.
6. There is considerable scope to lessen 
the problem of information asymmetry 
between host governments and mining 
companies – and indeed all companies 
in the extractive sector, including oil and 
gas. A great deal of information on actual 
or potential extractives projects exists 
in the private domain. It is produced by 
companies and consultants at various 
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available from commercially-available 
datasets. African governments typically 
lack access to these databases and, more 
importantly, reliable professional specialists 
who can use and interpret it on their behalf. 
Over a period of several years, and with 
adequate funding, this information could 
be accessed from a variety of sources, 
including commercial purchase, analysed, 
and put in the public domain as a global 
public good. This would enable independent 
applied global research to provide us with 
some more robust answers to the question 
of how different fiscal regimes and their 
main elements have worked across different 
administrations in time and place, thereby 
moving closer to evidence-based policy 
in the taxation of extractive industries. It 
could also fundamentally further empower 
organisations willing to advise actual/
potential host governments in their 
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